Remark: I’d like to thank Karl, Greg, and Lawrence, this is born out of several crazy discussions with the three of them. Thanks to my uncle too for recommending Althusser’s book.
In Positions, Marxist philosopher Althusser has an essay called “Soutenance d’Amiens” in which he attempts to look back at his work and emphasize some fundamental concepts. I was particularly interested in Althusser’s take on the concept of economics/the economy as a “determinant in the last instance” (I apologize for the bad translation).
Althusser opposed the concept to a purer form of determinism where the economic base determines every single element of the superstructure. As Robert Paul Resch writes in Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist Social Theory, “determination in the last instance by the economy means that its primacy establishes certain boundaries or limits to the autonomy of the political and ideological functions.”
In other words, the economic base determines the boundaries and the conditions of emergence of political and ideological functions, but, as long as they are not in contradiction with the economic base, these functions develop according to their own logic. For Althusser, it would be imprecise and useless to try to think these superstructures in purely economic terms.
I’d like to contrast this kind of determinism with a stronger determinism: physical determinism (although it seems like this point of view is becoming more and more inaccurate scientifically). The example I would like to approach this determinism through the example of literature. In essence, all literature is physical. Indeed, for the physical determinist, there is a way to explain Jane Austen’s life – including each and every one of his works – in purely physical terms. The practical barrier is not the only reason why we do not engage or aspire to engage in this kind of analysis. It seems like although (theoretically) we could analyze literature in physical terms, literature makes more sense in its own terms. Even though literature is ultimately determined by physics, it is useless but not imprecise to analyze literature in terms of physics.
Stepping back, we can now see that economic determinism “in the last instance” is less deep than physical determinism. From an epistemological standpoint, both sciences are not sufficient to study the object they determine. However, if we believe Althusser and the physical determinists, economics determines boundaries and conditions of existence of the superstructure whereas physics determines all physical phenomena “in depth.”
This brings me to the question that started this line of inquiry: I have been thinking about the often scary universalism of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. Hegel would argue that this dialectic is engrained in the very structure of our consciousness. The question is (bare with me): if we take the Hegelian struggle for freedom to be an organizing principle, and if we considered its position with respect to the object it determines (namely interpersonal, social, and political relations), would this position be more akin to the position of economics (for Althusser) or of physics (for the physical determinist)?
Do relations of power determine all interpersonal, social, and political relations, or do they determine the conditions of these relations and the implicit assumptions that structure and underlie them only? I would very tentatively say I am more on the side of a determinism “in the last instance.”
PS: I will go back and add some links in there soon to clarify concepts that I gloss over too quickly.
In Positions, Marxist philosopher Althusser has an essay called “Soutenance d’Amiens” in which he attempts to look back at his work and emphasize some fundamental concepts. I was particularly interested in Althusser’s take on the concept of economics/the economy as a “determinant in the last instance” (I apologize for the bad translation).
Althusser opposed the concept to a purer form of determinism where the economic base determines every single element of the superstructure. As Robert Paul Resch writes in Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist Social Theory, “determination in the last instance by the economy means that its primacy establishes certain boundaries or limits to the autonomy of the political and ideological functions.”
In other words, the economic base determines the boundaries and the conditions of emergence of political and ideological functions, but, as long as they are not in contradiction with the economic base, these functions develop according to their own logic. For Althusser, it would be imprecise and useless to try to think these superstructures in purely economic terms.
I’d like to contrast this kind of determinism with a stronger determinism: physical determinism (although it seems like this point of view is becoming more and more inaccurate scientifically). The example I would like to approach this determinism through the example of literature. In essence, all literature is physical. Indeed, for the physical determinist, there is a way to explain Jane Austen’s life – including each and every one of his works – in purely physical terms. The practical barrier is not the only reason why we do not engage or aspire to engage in this kind of analysis. It seems like although (theoretically) we could analyze literature in physical terms, literature makes more sense in its own terms. Even though literature is ultimately determined by physics, it is useless but not imprecise to analyze literature in terms of physics.
Stepping back, we can now see that economic determinism “in the last instance” is less deep than physical determinism. From an epistemological standpoint, both sciences are not sufficient to study the object they determine. However, if we believe Althusser and the physical determinists, economics determines boundaries and conditions of existence of the superstructure whereas physics determines all physical phenomena “in depth.”
This brings me to the question that started this line of inquiry: I have been thinking about the often scary universalism of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. Hegel would argue that this dialectic is engrained in the very structure of our consciousness. The question is (bare with me): if we take the Hegelian struggle for freedom to be an organizing principle, and if we considered its position with respect to the object it determines (namely interpersonal, social, and political relations), would this position be more akin to the position of economics (for Althusser) or of physics (for the physical determinist)?
Do relations of power determine all interpersonal, social, and political relations, or do they determine the conditions of these relations and the implicit assumptions that structure and underlie them only? I would very tentatively say I am more on the side of a determinism “in the last instance.”
PS: I will go back and add some links in there soon to clarify concepts that I gloss over too quickly.
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